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Abstract: During Cold War, the region of Eastern Europe was formed by European states that were 
behind the Iron Curtain.Once the communism has fallen and former Warsaw's Pact members have joined 
EU in 2004 and 2007 along with the Baltic republics, a New Eastern Europe comprising Ukraine, Republic 
of Moldova and the Caucasian Republics emerged at the border of EU. The north, west and south maritime 
frontiers of European Union are opposite with Eastern territorial one that are more difficult to control and 
defend  against  asymmetrical  threats  as:  organized  crime,  drugs  traffic,  arms  proliferation  and  illegal 
immigration.  this  paper  aims  to  demonstrate  that  EU's  policies  initiated  in  the  framework  of  Eastern 
Partnership (EaP) that wanted to bring peace in the Eastern neighborhood did not succeed to fulfill the 
desired goals. One explanation is that EU did not take in consideration the Russian dream of redesigning its 
sphere of influence in Eastern Europe. Another one is that the cultural, political and social differences 
between EU and its EaP partners led to the failure of the project. Thus, European Union's actions toward 
Eastern  vicinity  led  to  a  clash  between  two  civilizations:  East  and  West  as  well  as  to  a  geopolitical 
competition between Russian Federation and EU over their shared neighborhood. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The European Union, an ambitious supra-state project, born from the ashes of World War 
Two was initially designed for protecting the Old Continent from a new devastating World War. 
Nowadays, EU has become an important international actor, which “conquers” new territories, not 
through  military  means,  but  by  “attracting”  its  neighboring  countries  through  its  soft  power 
instruments. After the collapse of USSR and the fall of Iron Curtain, the Warsaw Pact members and 
the  three  Baltic  soviet  republics  (Lithuania,  Latvia  and  Estonia)  sought  an  alternative  for  their 
national security and interests. Joining European Union, the entity that was promoting the four 
fundamental free of movements: of people, goods, services and capital, became an immediate aim 
for the ex-communist countries, ravaged after more than 50 years of bankrupt planned economy, 
precarious social services and violation of human rights and freedoms. That is why in 2004 Poland, 
Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Malta, Cyprus and Slovenia and 
three years later, in 2007, Romania and Bulgaria embraced the European policies and values and 
became members of the European Union. 
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Being the greatest economy of the world, having the values of Gross Domestic Product – 
GDP  (12280.6  millions  of  euro)  one  of  the  highest  in  the  world,  the  life  expectancy  at  birth 
averaged at 79.2 (The 2012 Ageing Report, 2011), European Union is seen as a territory of wealth, 
great social services and attracts people all over the planet. The threats to the security of EU are 
perceived as not being traditional (as are for example the military one), but asymmetric such as: 
organized crime, terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, illegal immigration and 
Cross  Border  criminality.  Therefore,  the  European  Union  sought  measures  for  maintaining  its 
borders safely and keeping a favorable climate in its vicinity. That is why in 2003, the European 
Union  launched  the  first  European  Security  Strategy,  where  it  was  “in  European  interests  that 
countries on European border to be well-governed. Neighbors who are engaged in violent conflict, 
weak  states  where  organized  crime  flourishes  dysfunctional  societies  or  exploding  population 
growth on its borders all pose problems for Europe”. Subsequently, in 2008, with the emergence of 
new challenges to European security like globalization, cyber-terrorism, climate change, energy 
security (Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy, Providing Security in a 
Changing World, 2008), the European Security Strategy has been modified and completed. Also, 
after the new dynamic of the International System in the southern neighborhood, like the Arab 
Spring and the continuously political changes in North Africa and in the eastern neighborhood, 
before and after the Vilnius Summit, it is admitted that European Union needs a different security 
strategy, which have to be able to cope with the new International geopolitical changes. 
 
1. EASTERN PARTNERSHIP (EAP) EVOLUTION AND CONSEQUENCES 
 
In 2003, the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) was launched. Its aims was to support a 
pro-European  orientation,  democratization  and  liberalization  within  the  16  partner  members 
(Algeria,  Armenia,  Azerbaijan,  Belarus,  Egypt,  Georgia,  Israel,  Jordan,  Lebanon,  Libya,  the 
Republic of Moldova, Morocco, the Occupied Palestinian Territories, Syria, Tunisia and Ukraine), 
the countries that lie to the South and East of the European Union. Furthermore, ENP was created in 
order to assure an individual partnership between the EU and each individual neighbor through a 
single policy that promotes strong commitment to the human rights and freedoms, democracy and 
the rule of law (Joint communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the European and 
Social Committee and the Committee of the regions, 2013). Also, ENP had two dimensions, first is 
Euro-Mediterranean Partnership- EUROMED and second, Eastern Partnership.  
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“EUROMED,  formerly  known  as  the Barcelona  Process,  was  re-launched  in  2008  as  the 
Union for the Mediterranean (UfM), with the goal of developing concrete regional and sub-regional 
projects  in  the  economic,  energetic,  migration  and  environmental  fields.   The  Union  for  the 
Mediterranean promotes economic integration and democratic reform across 16 neighbors (Albania, 
Algeria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Mauritania, Monaco, 
Montenegro, Morocco, the Palestinian Authority, Syria, Tunisia and Turkey) to the EU’s south in 
North Africa and the Middle East” (Source, http://www.eeas.europa.eu/euromed/index_en.htm). 
The other dimension of the ENP addresses to the eastern neighborhood of the EU, more 
specifically to the six ex-Soviet republics: Belarus, Ukraine, Republic of Moldova, Azerbaijan, 
Armenia and Georgia. In this regard, the area that today is known as “the New Eastern Europe” 
(due to the fact that ex-members of Warsaw Pact have joined EU), became in the foreground of 
foreign European agenda in the last years. 
The Eastern Partnership was launched by the EU in 2009, at the Prague Summit. The EaP was 
created in order to test the EU’s ability to exist as an important international actor. Also it was 
designed by EU with the aim to act as a regional normative power, being able to make changes in 
the politic, economic and social fields  of its  neighbors and to  implement  European norms and 
values. EaP was perceived to reduce the economic and political differences between EU and EaP 
countries, through implementation of several European norms and reforms. The platforms of the 
EaP promote energy security, visa liberalization, developing financial investments and have created 
political and civic dialogue among the sides involved. Furthermore, EU adopted a “more and more” 
strategy, where more reforms were implemented resulted in more benefits that were offered and 
additional financial support (for the period 2011-2013 1.9 billion were available for bilateral and 
regional  cooperation,  including  350  milion  euro  of  additional  resources)  was  given  for 
implementing political and economic reforms. All this efforts would eventually lead to the signing 
of  Association  Agreements  (AA),  including  Deep  and  Comprehensive  Free  Trade  Agreements 
(DCFTAs) at the Eastern Partnership meetings. The last one took place on the 28-29 November 
2013 in Vilnius (Kuznecova, Potjomkina and Vargulis, 2013).    
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1.1 Consequences of the Vilnius Summit 
 
The  continuously  expansion  of  NATO  and  EU  in  the  former  soviet  sphere  of  influence, 
attracted the attention of Russian Federation, which perceived EaP as a threat to its own national 
interests. No more interested in maintaining a sphere of influence in Europe, but defending its 
borders and immediately vicinity, Russia imposed aggressive measures against EaP partners such as 
economic  embargoes  (the  import  of  wines  from  Republic  of  Moldova),  sustaining  territorial 
secession  in  independent  countries  (Abkhazia  and  South  Ossetia  in  Georgia,  Transnistria  and 
Gagauzia in Republic of Moldova) or getting involved in the domestic affairs of the EaP countries 
through Russophile parties (in Republic of Moldova and Ukraine). These measures were seen as 
hard  power  actions,  where  military  threats  and  energetic  blackmail  became  the  means  of  the 
Russian foreign policy. 
Also,  the  Russian  hard  power  was  in  contrast  with  the  European  Union  soft  power, 
understood as “the ability to affect others through positive attraction in order to obtain preferred 
outcomes and consequently, the types of resources associated with it include intangible factors such 
as institutions, ideas, values, culture and the perceived legitimacy of policies. (Nye, 2012) 
The Security Dilemma in a multipolar system alliance formations underlined that small states 
tend to choose the more powerful alliance and the risk of defection is very probably in the case of a 
better emerging alternative (Snyder, 1984). Being aware of this, EU adopted a different approach in 
the case of EaP, a process known as Europeanization. A broad definition of the Europeanization 
suggests the emergence of a belonging sentiment to the European identity, which is complementary 
to the national and regional identities. Furthermore, this concept is used for the European Union and 
its  action  of  spreading  the  European  norms,  policies  and  values  towards  other  states.  Also, 
Europeanization is seen as a process through which the states and the societies are modeled after the 
EU established standards. Having neighboring states, where societies adopted the European norms 
and values and feeling that they belong to the European civilization, in theory, the risk of defection 
shrinks. 
However,  in  practice  the  EaP  have  failed.  Four  of  the  EaP  partners  renounced  to  their 
European  approach,  and  just  Republic  of  Moldova  and  Georgia  still  maintain  their  European 
aspirations and subsequently initialed the Association Agreement at the Vilnius Summit.  
Belarus, considered the last European dictatorship and member of the Eurasian Economic 
Community (EurAsEC), was perceived hopeless in implementing the EaP norms (A Roadmap to the 
autumn 2013 Summit, 2012).   
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The  relations  between  EU  and  Azerbaijan  were  mostly  oriented  to  the  energy  agenda. 
Azerbaijan, a rich oil resources country had never intended to join EU and even if i t was a EaP 
partner and the negotiations to sign an AA were put in discussion, implementing the norms of EU in 
terms  of  human  rights  and  the  rule  of  law  were  in  contrast  with  the  authoritarian  style  of 
governance, based on a social pyramid that sustains the interest of ruling family and oligarchic clans 
(Kuznecova, Potjomkina and Vargulis, 2013a, pp 8-9).Perceived as a champion of the negotiation 
process among the EaP countries, Armenia has succeeded in July 2013 to establish a DCFTA with 
the  EU.  But  the  decision  taken  by  this  country,  on  3  September  2013,  to  join  the  Russia-led 
Customs Union was a major blow to the future of Eastern Partnership and a victory for Russian 
Federation, which once more, after the military intervention in 2008, in Georgia, has shown to the 
West that Caucasus will remain in their sphere of influence. 
In my opinion, the biggest stake of the EaP was Ukraine, the largest European continental 
country after Russia, with more than 50 million people and a country that has a huge agricultural 
and economic potential. But Ukraine (which literary means ,,at the border”) is a country between 
two civilizations, the West and the East and also the birth place of the Russian nation. A Russia 
without Ukraine is a country, but a Russia with Ukraine is an empire. Due to this consideration, any 
attempt of Ukraine to join the Western part became a threat to the national Russian interests. 
 
2.EASTERN EUROPE, EUROPE’S NEW POWDER KEG? 
 
2.1 EU and Russia – different ways of understanding security  
 
The eastern border of European Union is also its largest territorial one and is the buffer zone 
between EU and Russian Federation. For Russian Federation this area represents its west European 
border and also an ex-soviet territory, that once had the capital at Moscow.  In this regard, it is 
obvious that the two great European actors are looking for maintaining their influence over their 
common neighboring countries, in order to protect their own security. 
But the European approach in understanding security is different than the Russia’s one. On 
the  one  hand,  from  the  European  perspective,  the  military  conflicts  are  long  gone,  and  the 
asymmetrical threats are more relevant in threating the Union’s security. On the other hand, in a 
conventional war, European Union depends of the NATO’s military capabilities due to the fact that 
the  Union  does  not  have  a  united  and  single  European  army.  A  particular  situation  is  found 
regarding cooperation between the European’s intelligence services. Therefore, Berne Club reunites  
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the  secret  services  of  the  member  states  in  order  to  have  a  common  fight  against  international 
European  Union’s  security  threats.  But  the  concept  of  “need  to  share”  remains  at  a  low  level 
between  the  European  Union’s  secret  services,  focusing  more  on  sharing  secret  intelligence 
products regarding Organized Crime, Terrorism, arms proliferation or cyber-terrorism. As referring 
to  the  traditional  military  threat,  it  seems  that  this  one  remains  in  the  responsibility  of  each 
European state to deal with it. 
In  opposite,  the  notion  of  security  for  Russian  Federation  is  perceived  different.  Firstly, 
Russia remains a military power with nuclear capabilities. Also Russia uses military threatens in its 
foreign policy in order to deter the former soviet republics and to renounce to their European path. 
Nowadays, Russia is awakening from their national nightmare from the beginning of the 90’s, 
namely the dissolution of USS, and tries to reestablish its influence in Europe by changing the post-
soviet  order in  the Eastern  Europe. The larger  is  the territory that Russian controls  outside its 
borders, the higher is the security for their own frontiers. This Russian conception of security has its 
roots from the beginning of the Russian nation. Being a lowland people, with no natural fortress to 
defend their cities, the old medieval Kievan Rus’ were almost brought to extinction by the ferocious 
Mongol raids during 1237-1240. All Russian medieval and pre-modern history concentrates in the 
Great East European Plain, an immense insecurity lowland zone. This can be an explanation why 
Russian sought to control a large territory, in order to be able to protect their own citadels. 
In my opinion, all present Russian actions are related with their history and with their national 
psychology, influenced by a tumultuous past. On the one hand, the Russian millennial dream is 
wrote in the Peter’s the Great Testament. It reminds about the duty of the Tsar’s descendants to 
bring Russia to the shores of the “warm seas” and also underlines the dominance of Russia over its 
Christian neighboring states, due to the fact that Moscow, also entitled “the Third Rome” carries the 
Byzantine legacy. On the other hand, Russia’s power to regenerate itself determined the analogy 
with a phoenix bird, which has the capacity to rise from its ashes more powerful than initially had 
been, examples of this events being obvious in Russian history. After the almost collapse of the 
medieval  Russian  states,  Russia  became  an  empire  conquering  vast  territories  of  its  previous 
enemies. After the Bolshevik revolution in 1917, withdrawal from the First World War and the 
nearby  Nazi  conquer,  Russian  Empire  became  USSR,  incorporating  1/6  from  the  total  world 
continental territory. After the dissolution of the USSR, the expectations are higher and perspectives 
brighter. 
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2.2 Ukraine between European soft power and Russian hard power 
 
Where  two  civilizations  clashes,  two  diplomatic  approaches  collide  too.  In  this  regard, 
Ukraine is in the middle of great geopolitical interests and became the key piece on an international 
chess table. Through its hard power measures, such as giving a low gas price in exchange of a 
Russian oriented direction or maintaining its military troops in Sevastopol (where is located the 
entire  Black  Sea  Russian  fleet),  Russia  successfully  “hijacked”  Ukraine  from  the  European 
approach, first in 2008 when Ukraine did not joined NATO, and five years later at the Eastern 
Partnership Summit in Vilnius, when Ukraine did not signed AA. 
But  the  process  of  Europeanization  had  a  great  impact  over  the  Ukrainian  society. 
Immediately after the Vilnius Summit, people went out in the streets and protested against the 
decision took by the politicians and demanded the resignation of the president, Viktor Yanukovych. 
These protests degenerated into ferocious street fights and had finally led to the president’s fled to 
Russia and the establishment of a pro-Occidental government. 
 However, in Ukraine has appeared an unexpected turn of events that destabilized the country 
and also the whole European region. Moscow accused and characterized the new Western oriented 
political class by being a real threat for the rights and liberties of the Russian minority. In this 
regard, Russian Federation supported the proclamation of independence of the people from the 
Autonomous  Republic  of  Crimea  (with  a  Russian  ethnic  majority),  which  after  a  referendum, 
contested  and  unrecognized  by  the  Western  states,  voted  for  the  separation  from  Ukraine  and 
annexation to the Russian Federation.From the Russian perspective, the annexation of Crimea was 
in accordance with the right of every ethnic majority group to the self - determination, but the 
International Law stipulates that an annexation should be an act of will of the people from the 
country that will lose its sovereignty. Due to the fact that Crimea was just an Autonomous Region 
which belonged de jure to the Ukraine’s national territory and not a sovereign state, the act of 
annexation can be considered illegitimate. 
What initially was designed to bring peace in the European neighborhood, in my opinion did 
exactly the contrary. With a difficult situation in Ukraine, where the Russian military intervention in 
the  Eastern  provinces,  after  the  continuous  riots  of  the  Russian  ethnic  majority  became  a  real 
scenario, with the probability of appearing a similar situation in Belarus, in order to change the 
dictatorial Lukashenko’s regime and with the possibility that the “frozen conflicts” (Transnistria, 
Nagorno-Karabakh  region,  Abkhazia  and  South  Ossetia)  to  become  “hot”,  Europe  is  facing  a 
difficult and dangerous situation. Therefore, the Eastern neighborhood of the EU became vulnerable  
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and could be perceived more and more as a region of insecurity and could have a destructive effect 
even over the EU, due to the fact that this situation would encourage the secessionist movements in 
entities  like  Scotland,  Catalonia,  Basque  Region,  North  Cyprus,  Southern  Tyrol  or  in  the 
Szeklerland in Romania. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
The present geopolitical situation in Eastern Europe is characterized by many variables and no 
one can predict exactly what would happen within this territory. There are many predictions, but in 
these circumstances, in my opinion, Europe has just opened the Pandora’s box of the post-soviet 
order. The two major European actors, Russia and European Union, are now in direct competition 
and like in the Security Dilemma, increasing one’s security means threating the other’s one. The 
interconnected relations between this two actors are complex and it seems that the two  powers 
depends one of each other, but none of them renounce to their policy of exploiting the other’s 
vulnerabilities. Russian’s dream to become again a world power raised concerns among the EU’s 
member states and I personally consider that the annexation of Crimea brought Russian Federation 
back in Europe after 20 years of losing its ex-soviet sphere of influence.  
In  conclusion,  I  believe  that  NATO,  as  a  political  and  military  alliance  that  has  the 
fundamental objective of protecting the member states against military threats, became legitimate in 
the face of the new challenges that shrink the European security. 
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